Gustavo Petro became Colombia’s first left-wing president on 7 August 2022, coming to power amid a worsening security scenario despite strides made by a historic 2016 peace accord with the FARC guerilla group under Juan Manuel Santos’ administration.
After the FARC demobilized, new armed groups formed while existing ones strengthened their presence after rebuffing peace negotiations. Violence persisted and began to worsen because of weak state presence and past administrations’ failure to implement the 2016 peace accord, failing to safeguard the lives of demobilized combatants. Illicit markets also continued to boom, providing ample incentives for large criminal structures to expand violently and defy the state in search of profit.
Petro’s political ideology and past as a member of the M-19 guerilla, which negotiated peace with the government in 1990, set the stage for peace talks with the remaining armed groups threatening Colombia’s stability. Petro would embark on a search for Total Peace, the name given to his ambitious policy of simultaneously negotiating with politically motivated guerillas and large criminal organizations to completely pacify Colombia.
Measuring the success of such a policy in the short term is difficult. There is no standard for how peaceful negotiations must be before yielding disarmament, or how long they should take before military action is favored once more. Red lines are hard to draw when they imply a return to the loss of civilian lives. But when 2022 became the most violent year since the peace accord signing, short-term results and security improvement became necessary.
Which Groups Are Included in ‘Total Peace’?
Colombia’s past 60-plus years of armed conflict and peace accords have yielded a complicated, ever-changing panorama of actors and conflict dynamics.
Total Peace, following the legal framework under which Petro can maneuver to establish peace talks, divides groups between politically motivated groups and criminal groups. This distinction is muddled but holds weight when it comes to assessing the incentives an armed group considers to disarm. Does the armed actor seek particular policy concessions that it feels are largely unachievable through democratic means? Does it seek to overthrow the state? Or does it seek profit through violent control of illicit economies, only motivated by a negotiated settlement that allows it to enjoy its spoils in peace while paying a marginal part of its due sentence?
Total peace gave two groups political status: The ELN (Ejército de Liberación Nacional) guerilla and the EMC (Estado Mayor Central). Negotiations between the government and each of these two groups hold to this day, despite multiple impasses.
The ELN (Ejército de Liberación Nacional) is a Marxist guerilla that has been active since 1964 with about 3,000 combatants. Negotiations with the ELN have been historically and characteristically difficult. Historically, attempts in 1975, 1998, 2008 and 2017 have been shaped by the ELN’s recalcitrance towards political and military concessions, refusing to end targeted kidnappings, and perpetrating terrorist attacks during negotiations. Characteristically, the ELN is formed by multiple fronts that act with less of a hierarchical chain of command, which increases the risk of some fronts refusing to demobilize under a peace agreement.
The EMC (Estado Mayor Central) is composed of FARC dissidents who rejected disarmament under the 2016 peace accord. With a national presence and more than 3,500 combatants, the EMC grew to become a federation of fronts led by former mid-tier FARC commanders and fed by young, poor, rural youths. Nowhere near the size or cohesion of the former FARC, the EMC is still the largest and most structured of its remnants.
Left out of Total Peace negotiations was the Segunda Marquetalia, a group formed by FARC commanders who had demobilized but returned to arms after feeling cheated by the government’s lackluster implementation of the 2016 peace accord.
On the other hand, the Gulf Clan, or AGC (Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia), the country’s largest criminal organization, created by former paramilitaries, has unsuccessfully tried to position itself as a politically motivated group to access greater concessions through peace talks. Negotiations faltered after the government failed to pass a legal framework under which it could offer favorable conditions for the AGC leaders to surrender under.
Similarly, the Pachenca, or ACSN (Autodefensas Conquistadoras de la Sierra Nevada), a smaller criminal organization also created by former paramilitaries, has more vocally sought political recognition and maintained talks with the government.
Finally, Total Peace brokered talks and truces between the colliding Shottas and Espartanos gangs in the Pacific port city of Buenaventura, between 16 gangs of Medellín and the Aburrá Valley, and between six gangs in the city of Quibdó.
Thus, Total Peace sought to negotiate and pacify the groups most responsible for violence across Colombia — the ELN, EMC, AGC, and ACSN. Negotiations with the ELN and EMC are ongoing and have made relative progress, while negotiations with the AGC and ACSN have failed to take off and the military has resumed offensive operations.
How has ‘Total Peace’ affected security?
Total Peace’s bilateral and unilateral ceasefires have undoubtedly de-escalated fighting between armed groups and the state, according to data from the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP). In 2023, attacks against security forces dropped 47%, while the number of security forces murdered and wounded also fell by 33% and 39%, respectively. Fighting amongst armed groups slightly fell by 2%, reversing the upward trend of recent years.
Civilians have also experienced a respite from Colombia’s worsening security situation in the past few years: Mass forced displacement in 2023 dropped by 47%, the number of forcibly displaced individuals fell by 31%, and confinements dropped by 51% from 2022 to 2023. The murder of social leaders fell by 25%. There are disparities when it comes to 2023 homicide data from government sources: while the National Institute of Forensic Science reports a 5% increase in the number of homicides, the police report a 2% reduction in the past year.
However, JEP data also showed that kidnappings and reported extortions have increased by 78% and 11%, respectively. Considering that extortions are rarely reported, increases in extortion are likely to be higher and more costly to business owners, which is coherent with field interviews. Similarly, attacks against productive infrastructure like oil and gas pipelines, electrical towers, and hydroelectric plants have increased by 62%. These attacks are a way to push extortions onto the companies that operate them while stealing resources. The number of reported non-state actor checkpoints has also increased by 23%.
These worsening kidnapping and extortion statistics point to tightening social and economic control of civilian populations living under the presence of armed actors allowed to govern with little pushback in the name of negotiated peace and reduced violence. Yet the JEP study cited here shows no spatial correlation between extortion increases in most areas controlled by the EMC and ELN, which could point to formal peace negotiations positively affecting these metrics if reports are to be trusted.
Is ‘Total Peace’ possible?
Total Peace’s initial goal of negotiating peace with all armed actors seems far removed. While negotiations with the politically motivated ELN and EMC have advanced, there is no legal framework to carry out the intended negotiations with criminal groups like the AGC. Other FARC remnants such as the Segunda Marquetalia, the Coordinadora Guerillera del Pacífico, and the Comandos de Frontera have not been granted political status, and they refuse to participate in formal negotiations while classified as criminal groups.
Aside from the intricacies of each group and their respective negotiations, public opinion, political capital, and time are incredibly constraining factors. Petro finished 2023 with a 26% approval and a 66% disapproval rating — his worst yet. Public support for peace negotiations has also fallen. A year into Petro’s presidency, those who supported negotiations with armed groups fell from 76% to 59%.
Negotiations that fail to produce concrete results and improvements in security (and perception) can be the final nail in the coffin of a presidency, pushing the political pendulum far in the opposite direction. Andrés Pastrana’s failed 2001 negotiations, where the former FARC received a large, demilitarized zone in the Caguán region, gave way to Alvaro Uribe’s mano dura presidency in 2002. Uribe (2002-2010) and Juan Manuel Santos (2010-2018) had eight years each to implement their policies. Uribe militarily weakened the FARC for Santos to continue doing so and negotiate disarmament. Petro cannot legally get reelected and has no clear successor. His approval rating, points to unfavorable chances for his coalition winning in 2026, although it is too early to tell.
Armed groups are also presented with a dilemma. Even if negotiations produce a peace accord in the next 32 months, there is no guarantee it will stand under a new president — especially if an opposition candidate wins. The lack of policy continuity from the Colombian state severely affects trust and legitimacy in its dealings.
Critics were doubtful when the 2016 peace accord implementation was not central to Total Peace. Although the peace accord was ultimately included as a pillar in Total Peace, implementation has not significantly improved from the past Duque administration, which actively campaigned against it. Legislatively fast-tracking the 2016 accord to become law soon after its signing was expected to guarantee its implementation for the next 15 years, technically forcing Duque to implement it. Regardless, his administration dragged its feet and severely set implementation back.
Petro backed the 2016 accord, but has prioritized his own policy instead of making up for lost time. He recently stated the accord would not be met within the stipulated 15-year period, essentially reneging on a constitutional promise to the country and the demobilized signatories.
One of the worst effects of lackluster implementation has been the murder of 419 demobilized FARC members and the overwhelming impunity in over 80% of the murders. Why would an armed group lay down their weapons if the state cannot protect them from the threat of death or recruitment by other armed actors? Why reach policy agreements if they can be undermined or defunded by a new president?
It seems unlikely Petro will turn things around in the next two-thirds of his term. The Constitutional Court has already clarified that Congress must pass a law to negotiate with criminal actors, but his majority there has dissipated. The current battle to approve his health reform will cost him significant political capital, if he even manages to succeed. Yet the election of a new Attorney General this year will likely replace the opposition with an ally in the search for Total Peace.
Overall, Total Peace has yielded mixed results. So far, the price seems to be time and space for some armed actors to strengthen and expand. Petro must achieve long-lasting concessions before time runs out and a new president steps in. Momentary reductions in conflict intensity and the lives saved because of it are invaluable, yet more casualties will only be delayed if conflict re-intensifies with stronger opponents after negotiations fail to yield appeasement.
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